Will the Preferences URL Specification pose a security threat?

Question

Re: your posting Switchboard "use of URLs" (link follows this comment)

I am concerned that Switchboard's "open/extendible" approach could be or become Elementary's 'Achilles heal'.

How can the URL system mitigate the threat posed by malicious code injection / exploits?

These "unchartered waters" may represent a deal breaker for people considering adopting or remaining with Elementary OS.

For me, the Pantheon desktop interface is Elementary's killer feature. Please don't kill it - for the sake of a "nice to have" feature.

Wishing you and your team all the best for 2017

Answer 1

I have a strong feeling that this question comes from confusion about what the URL scheme is.

The Preferences URL specification is only a way to open settings applications to the correct location. It is not a way to transmit any kind of data.

Settings URLs look like this:

✔️ settings://applications/startup

This URL will only open the settings application to the correct location for the user to take further action.

Never like this:

❌ settings://applications/startup?add-app=malicious%20app%20name

The spec does not intend to describe a way to handle data and you're right that doing so would probably not be a good idea.

TL;DR Settings URLs only open the settings app. They do not transmit data. They cannot change settings. They do not interact with any settings backends like gsettings or keyfiles.